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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION - ExHAUs-
TION OF STATE REMEDIES AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO RELIEF IN FEDERAL
COURTS - Petitioner was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of
violating a broadly phrased vagrancy statute which provided that "every ***
dissolute person *** is a vagrant."'1 According to Mr. Justice Black in his
dissenting opinion the conviction was based primarily on what the petitioner
had said in public speeches in a Los Angeles public park.2 A notice of appeal
was immediately filed in the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior
Court. Petitioner thereupon made a substitution of attorneys. The notice of
the hearing in the appellate court was sent to the original counsel who, upon
receiving it, returned it to the clerk and informed him of the substitution. The
clerk assured the counsel that the notice would be sent to the proper attorney.
It was not done and the conviction was affirmed on default. Petitioner then
applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari after the
Appellate Department had refused to vacate the judgment. He contended
that he had been deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because the vagrancy statute was vague and indefinite and that he had
not been given notice and hearing in the Appellate Court. Held, Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting, that the writ of certiorari had been improvidently
granted and should be dismissed as the decision below rested on adequate
state grounds and the federal questions had not been seasonably raised in
accordance with the requirements of state law. Edelman v. State of California,
73 Sup. Ct. 293 (1953).
The question of the constitutionality of the vagrancy statute was not raised
in the trial court. It was first mentioned in the grounds of appeal and as
the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment on default it was not there con-
sidered or passed upon. No deprivation of any constitutional right was alleged
in the motion to vacate the judgment. Thus it is seen that the petitioner
had not raised the constitutional questions in a timely fashion nor had they
been passed on or considered by any state court. In such a case the Supreme
Court will not usually assert jurisdiction.3
It seems however, as contended by Mr. Justice Black in the dissenting
opinion, that the court rested its dismissal on a belief that the petitioner could
still test the validity of his conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding in the
California courts 4 and on a presumption that a state will not deny a remedy
for deprivation of a constitutional right such as here alleged.5 The implication
is that if the petitioner had exhausted his state remedies the Supreme Court
would have heard the case on its merits.
The rule that the federal courts will not grant relief until all state remedies
have been exhausted is well established.6 Nevertheless this doctrine pre-
1. California Penal Code §647 (5) (Deering 1949).
2. 73 Sup. Ct. 293, 297.
3. Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 202 U.S. 275 (1906). Mutual Life Insurance Corn-
pany v. McGrew, 188 U.S. 291 (1903).
4. In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942) (habeas corpus is the only
means of testing the constitutionality of a conviction after recourse to appeal is ex-
hausted).
5. United States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 463 (1936). Robb v. Connolly,
111 U.S. 624 (1884). (The duty to guard and enforce federal constitutional rights rests
equally on the State and Federal Courts).
6. Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1943); United States v. Tylor, 269 U.S. 13
(1925). See 62 Stat. 960 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. 1946).
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supposes the existence of some adequate state remedy 7 and in the absence of
such a remedy the federal courts will grant relief.8 It is on this basis that the
dissent would pass on the substantive constitutional questions involved or
have the case remanded to the Appellate Department for a clarification of the
basis of its action. 9
An examination of the cases indicates that the petitioner could have used
the writ of habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of his conviction in the
California Supreme Court."0 It is also to be noted that he could have alleged
two counts in the application for the writ: (1) deprivation of due process
because of the vagueness of the vagrancy statute and (2) deprivation of due
process and equal protection because of the failure of the Appellate Court to
give him notice of the hearing.t
It is then seen, with reference to the adequacy of these state remedies that:
(1) even though it is generally held that a criminal statute which is so in-
definite and uncertain that men of common intelligence will differ substan-
tially as to its meaning or application is unconstitutional and void as a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,1- it has been
held that the very statute here under attack is a valid exercise of the legislative
authority'," and (2) California provides that failure to send notice of the
hearing in the Appellate Department shall not affect the jurisdiction of the
said department.
14
In order to grant the petitioner relief on the state level the California courts
would be obliged to either negative prior holdings that the statute is con-
stitutional or declare their own rules of procedure invalid as constituting a
deprivation of due process or equal protection. This, together with the fact
that the only remedy the petitioner could avail himself of in the state courts 5
could be used only to test jurisdiction 16 and constitutionality 17 and could
not operate as a writ of error 18 or to raise any question as to whether the
7. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211
(1946).
8. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (With reference to procedural morass
in Illinois); Ex Parte Hawk, 221 U.S. 114, 118 (1943); See 47 Mich. L. Rev. 72 (1948).
9. See State Tax Commissioner v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939) (sent back
because of supervening events); ef. Herb v. Pitcairn. 324 U.S. 117 (1944).
10. In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1912).
11. Ct. Cochran v. State of Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) where it was held that
Kansas denied Cochran equal protection in refusing him privileges of appeal that -t
afforded to others.
12. Gorin v. United States, 111 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1940), Aff'd. 312 U.S. 19
(1941); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Balzer v. Caler, 74 P.2d 839
(Cal. App. 1937), Aff'd 11 Cal.2d 663, 82 P.2d 19 (1938).
13. State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933); In re McCue, 12 Cal.
App. 145, 95 Pac. 110 (1908) upholding §647 (5) as constitutional. It was said that,
"One charged with being an idle, lewd or dissolute person is sufficiently advised of the
character of his offense." Accord, Ex Porte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402 (1874), holding that
"lewdness" is sufficiently explicit so as not to violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Construction of an immigration law).
14. Revised Appellate Department Rules, Rule 3 (b) (Deering 1949).
15. Habeas corpus, see note 4 supra.
16. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Ex Porte Drew, 188 Cal. 717, 207
Pac. 249 (1922); Ex Porte Moore, 71 N.D. 274, 300 N.W. 37 (1941); Ryan. v. Nygaard
70 N.D. 687, 297 N.W. 694 (1941).
17. Ex Porte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d
22 (1942); State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917); Ex
Porte McAlpine, 47 S.D. 472, 199 N.W. 478 (1924).
18. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442 (1925); Ex Parte Conner, 16 Cal.2d 701, 108
P.2d 10 (1940).
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facts charged were sufficient to constitute the offense or not,1 9 lends great
weight to the contention that there was no adequate state remedy for the
petitioner to fall back on.
It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has always accorded the
rights guaranteed by the first Ten Amendments, especially those of freedom of
speech, press and religion, a preferred constitutional position.-' This, taken
in conjunction with the facts outlined above and the precedents of liberaliza-
tion of procedural requirements in such cases,2 1 would lead to the position
that the court ought to have heard the case on the merits or remanded it
to the Appellate Department for a clarification of the basis of its action.
The interests of preserving a preferred position for the basic civil rights while
still maintaining a reasonably orderly procedure would best be served by the
latter course of action. W. JAMES LIEBELER
HIGHWAYS - TITLE TO FEE AND RIGHTS OF ABUTTING OWNERS - RIGHTS
AS TO SOIL, TREES, GRASS, MINERALS AND OTHER MATERIALS WITHIN
HIGHWAYS. - Plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land lying on both sides
of a section line. Under the authority of state law, a highway had been built
on the section line. Plaintiff posted the land against hunting on both sides
of the highway. He sued for an injunction restraining the defendant from
hunting game on the highway and right of way. Affirming a decision of the
trial court, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the defendant was
not entitled to hunt wild game along the highway because the plaintiff owned
the fee to the land upon which the highway was located, subject only to the
right of the public to use the road for highway and travel purposes. Rutten v.
Wood, 57 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1953).
While the case is of interest to sportsmen, its true significance is found in
the light it casts upon the rights of abutting landowners to drill, explore, lease
and remove minerals from land underlying a highway. The decision of the
court clearly indicates that the only interest possessed by the public is an
easement of way upon the highway, the landowner retaining the soil, springs,
mines, quarries, timber and the like, although there appears to be a right in
the public officials to use suitable materials for improving or repairing the
road.1 The owner of real property abutting a street is presumed to own to the
center of the street. 2 A transfer of land conveys the soil to the center of the
highway, if nothing contrary appears from the grant.
3
19. Ex Parte Cutler, 1 Cal. App.2d 238, 36 P.2d 441 (1934); Ex Parte Ruef, 150
Cal. 666, 89 Pac. 605 (1907).
20. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
(1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); 33 Minn. L. Rev. 390 (1949); 48
Col. L. Rev. 427 (1948).
21. In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) a conviction of breach of the
peace was reversed on the basis of a charge given in the trial court to which no objection
had been taken and which had gone unnoticed and unargued through the entire pro-
ceedings in the Illinois Appellate courts, being ferreted out only by the independent re-
search of the supreme court justices; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); 59
Yale L.J. 971 (1950).
1. Byron K. and William F. Elliott, Roads and Streets §499 (1926).
2. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0116 (1943); "An owner of land bounded by a road or
street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may he shown."
3. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1010 (1943). "A transfer of land bounded by a highway
passes the title to the person whose estate is transferred to the soil of the highway in
front to the center thereof unless a different intent appears from the grant."
